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Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
EXECUTIVE DETERMINATION AND ROLES AND MISSIONS 
There is an alarming indication that increasing attention in the 
Pentagon is being directed toward removing basic roles and missions of the 
Armed Services from existing statute and making them subject only to executive 
determination. 
Such a move is being advocated under the guise of "strengthening" 
the Secretary of Defense and "streamlining" the Defense Department. This may 
strengthen the executive agency. But it \'l"ill weaken legislative authority 
and status in an area in which Congress has wisely and resolutely insisted 
on the exercise of its prercgative and responsibility since the founding of 
our country. 
What are these "roles and missions"? Briefly these constitute the 
specific provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, amended, which set 
forth the fundamental and basic roles and missions of each of the Armed Services. 
In a sense these provisions of law constitute a charter for each armed service, 
a kind of directive from Congress stating the purpose for which Congress, in 
accordance with its constitutional respansibility, creates, provides for, and 
maintains each of the armed services, 
It must be clearly understood that the statutory prescription of roles 
and missions is not a detailed statement of the specific day-to-day jobs, 
weapons, techniques, research projects and routine activities. Rather, roles 
and missions in law are stated in broad, flexible and elastic terms, which 
do not make this statutory assignment of roles and missions a straight-
jacket, a restriction, or an impediment to scientific and technological pr•gress, 
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I doubt if anyone today could prescribe in more fundamental and more 
flexible terms the roles and missions of the armed services as they were 
written into the National Security Act of 1947 with its subsequent amendment. 
It must be clearly understood that the roles and missions of the 
National Security Act are separate and distinct from the detailed assign-
ment of "functi«..ns" of the Armed Services~ The functions of the Armed 
Services are the details cf the jobs and duties cf the Armed Services, stated 
in more specific terms than exists in law. Essentially, the functions, which 
are prescribed by the executive authority of the President or the Secretary 
of Defense, are adjustable from time to time to new techniques, new weapons, 
new scientific discoveries. Such functions are amplifications ~f the •asic 
roles and missions prescribed by law. 
So, in the c~mbination of the wording of the roles and missions in 
the National Security Act as written by Congress and the detailed, adjustable 
assignment of specific functions by the executive, there is a completely 
proper, worka~le, and successful device by which the legislative and the 
executive can exercise appropriate authority with respect to what the Armed 
Services are to do. 
This matter of statutory prescriptions of roles and missions is no 
new issue. In fact, it was probably the fundamental issue connected with 
the National Security Act ~f 1947. It certainly received more attenti~n 
from Congress in its consideration ~f that bill than any other feature ~f 
that law. 
I would like to briefly review some of the pertinent facts in connec-
ti~n with the inclusion of roles and missions in the National Security Act of 
1947, as amended. 
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As originally proposed, the National Security Act of 1947 did not 
include the statutory outline of roles and missions. Rather, it was proposed 
that an executive order on roles and missions would be issued upon passage 
of the security act. Hmvever, Congress, in its wisdom, decided that it was 
not only the right of Congress to prescribe basic roles and missions for the 
Armed Services but it was an inescapable responsibility of Congress to so do, 
Such an attitude on the part of Congress was not readily accepted by the exec-
utive sponsors of the proposed national security act. Congress was resolute 
in its position and set forth in properly worded provisions the fundamental 
roles and missions of each of the Armed Services, 
I would like to point out that Congress, alert to the practical 
realities of defense matters, recognized that twG elements of the Armed Services 
were in jeopardy, Because they considered those elements to be necessary to the 
a~tainment of a properly balanced defense organization and because such jeopardy 
should not be permitted to continue, Congress was more precise in the 
:;>rescdption of roles and missions for naval aviation and the Marine Corps. 
Congress reaffirmed in even more emphatic terms, through Public 
Law 416, 82d Congress, 2d Session, its insistence upon a continued maintenance 
of a combat ready Marine Corps as a national force in readiness. Congress 
underlined its attitude and determination in this respect by stating that the 
~ommandant of the Marine Corps should have coequal status with other members 
~f the JCS in consideration of all matters pertaining to the Marine Corps and 
that, among other provisions, the Marine Corps should be maintained at a strength 
~f three co~bat divisions and three air wings. 
It was perfectly obvious at that time that powerful factions within 
the Armed Services bitterly cpposed this Congressional decision. 
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There is not the slightest doubt in my mind but what the Marine Corps 
~nll be destroyed as a combat force in readiness if present efforts to remove 
roles and missions from the law are successful. There is no place for the 
Marine Corps as it has developed, as Congress wants it, and as the country 
needs it, in the master plan of those who wish to centralize all military 
authority under somebody in the Pentagon. 
It is just as certain that our balanced naval power, with its unsur-
passed naval aviation, as well as its Marine landing forces, will be destroyed 
if the roles and missions are removed from statute. We will find the United 
States, which is in fact an island nation dependent upon maritime power for 
economic and military survival, possessing a Navy which no longer will contain 
the unique American attribute of sea power -- the balanced fleet. 
This effort -- and it is a persistent one -- to remove r~les ~d mis-
sions from law is not only a matter of military importance. It is nf basic 
constitutional importance which is impossible to over-emphasize in matters of 
legislative - executive relationship. In a practical sense the statutory 
prescription of roles and missions is one of the few meaningful instruments 
by which Congress can discharge its proper responsibility with respect to 
defense policy. If roles and missions for the Armed Services, as now prescri~ed 
by law, are removed from existing statute and made subject to executive whim, 
little will remain for Congress to do except appropriate monies for the Pentagone 
This effort, which is gaining momentum within the Pentagon today, 
is one of the most fundamental issues of our times. Congress could not, and 
I predict will not, look lightly or casually upon attempts to divest Congress 
of its authority and its responsibility to prescribe these basic roles and 
missions. Those persons who have, since 1947, refused to accept the decision 
of Congress to include roles and missions in the National Security Act must not 
be permitted to succeed With their efforts to undo this Congressional decision. 
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The~e has not, in recent years, been a more clearcut manifestation 
of a Congressional mandate in defense policies than the Congressional deter-
mination to prescribe roles and missions rather than leave it to the executive. 
I don't believe that Congress will permit this Pentagon power play to 
succeed. I do not believe that Congress and the American people will ever 
permit the PentRgon to erase the statutory safeguards that assure a continued 
existence of the Marines as an ever-ready combat force. 
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